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EU ENLARGEMENT, 
POLAND AND THE ENYIRONMENT
From “Euro-euphoria” to “Euro-realism”
The collapse of State socialism in Eastern Europę raised high expecta- 
tions about a possible quick integration with the West. The notion of the 
“return to Europę” has influenced and shaped public debates in the Cen­
tral and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) as much or even morę 
than the slogan “We are the people” back in 1989 [Mangott, 1995, p. 99], 
“The enlargement of the European Union to include the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europę can be considered as the finał step in the 
reintegration of the European continent after almost half a century of 
forced division [Mayhew, 1998, xiii]. This process did not begin in the 
“revolutions” of 1989 but in ordinary people fighting Soviet domination, 
e.g. the Hungarian revolution of 1956, the Czechoslovak Spring of 1968 
and the long series of Polish revolts from the Poznan uprising in 1956, 
the “self-limiting” revolution of Solidarity and the landslide election vic- 
tory at the 1989 (semi-) free elections.
Eastern enlargement has been the most challenging enlargement in 
the entire history of European integration, as the countries involved are 
undergoing complex triple transitions. The promise of systemie change 
was inereased welfare and higher living standards for all, but distri- 
butional outeomes have rarely been equal. There have been both win- 
ners and - unfortunately - many losers. So the European integration 
process has been a complex, multi-dimensional and multi-level process. 
Unlike the previous enlargements, it will entail numerous substantial
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structural changes in EU institutions, procedures and overall modes of 
functioning. In addition, it is assumed that enlargement will incur high 
budgetary burdens on EU incumbents, followed by modest trade benefits 
in the łonger term. Furthermore, this asymmetry, combined with eco- 
nomic ineąuality among current EU members, will necessitate consider- 
able skilful political “manoeuvring” and implementation of carefully 
weighted compensation packages for those who are likely to be affected 
most negatively. It is no secret that Spain, Portugal and France, for ex- 
ample, fear that present structures that benefit “the EU South” such as 
CAP and the regional and structural funds will be changed due to the 
enlargement of the EU to the East. Last but not least, Eastern enlarge­
ment involves considerable security interests and implications.
In fact, peaceful political development and the increasing prosperity of 
the newly emerging democracies in a broad sense seem to be the most 
significant long-term benefits for the EU as a whole. EU enlargement is 
“soft security policy becoming hard”. Although any ąualification of such 
gains essentially evades the possibilities of standard economic calculus, 
they obviously play a significant role in broader decision- and policy- 
-making [Barta and Richter, 1996, p. 1]. The enlargement process as 
such seems to be irreversible, the main ąuestion is, when and how it will 
take place, and, not least, what kind of European integration will de- 
velop after enlargement.
While a “second Marshall plan” for the CEECs - an eastern dream 
right after the collapse of State socialism - proved to be an illusion, the 
EU has already secured a continuous flow of resources to the CEECs 
during the 1990s, wothin the framework of the PHARE programme. Still 
this form of assistance in terms of money has been fairly Iow compared 
to the transfers given to the less developed EU incumbents. In 1996, per 
capita commitments under the PHARE facility were ECU 5.2 for the 
Czech Republic, ECU 5.3 for Poland, ECU 9.9 for Hungary and ECU 11 
for Slovakia. In the same year, net per capita transfers from the EU 
amounted to ECU 627.3 for Ireland, ECU 373.5 for Greece, ECU 281.2 
for Portugal and ECU 152.0 for Spain. However, Iow as EU transfers to 
the eastern applicants have been as yet, they helped, besides financing 
educational, infrastructure and consulting projects, to create the founda- 
tions of an institutional framework for the absorption of futurę higher 
transfers from the EU. [Richer et. al, 1996, p. 6] However, the admini- 
strative capacity is still long behind, seen in the EU-context.
Today, twelve years after the “break through”, enthusiasm for the last 
step, i.e. EU-membership, still exists, but the views on futurę EU-mem- 
bership has become much morę “realistic” in step with the opening of ne- 
gotiations with the EU on the most “delicate” issues such as agriculture,
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The Copenhagen criteria from June 1993
- Establishment and stability of institutions guaranteeing human 
rights and respect for minorities, the rule of law, and democracy
- Readiness to accept the ever increasing “aquis communautaire”, 
and to take on the obligations of membership including adher- 
ence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union
- Establishment of a functioning and effective market economy
- Capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces 
within the Union
- And, finally, the EU’s ability to absorb the acceding countries 
movement of labour, land, and environment. Euro-realism and even 
Euro-scepticism are growing. The initial hopes soon gave way to disillu- 
sionment and disenchantment, both among the political elite and among 
the generał public in the CEECs, which can be seen reading the public 
opinion polis on EU-membership.
In some cases, European integration might prove to have a negative 
effect on the economies of countries undergoing transformation. In other 
words, a dilemma between transformation and integration may exist. 
The demands from the EU are formulated in the Copenhagen criteria. 
However, the priorities of socio-economic transformation do not neces- 
sarily coincide with the priorities dictated by the logie of European inte­
gration. So the applicant countries are facing a “integration-dilemma”, 
including some contradictions between integration and transformation. 
However, many economic policies, though seemingly determined by the 
accession process and a part of the CEECs implementing the EU laws, 
would have been undertaken anyway, because they at the same time ad- 
dress transformational objectives such as the creation of free-market 
economy institutions [Stulik, 1999, p. 153]. It seems that “Europę” is 
perceived morę and morę often by its citizens mainly in instrumental 
and pragmatic terms, i.e. as a structure which should solve economic 
problems, while political issues are not perceived as problems of primary 
importance. That conclusion was drawn not least after the Nice-summit. 
Closer political integration has to be based on a common identity shared 
by European citizens, however, such support “from below” for a morę 
federalized Europę does not exist today.1
1 See also Arturas Valionis, “The Perception of Europę: The Prospects for Political Inte 
gration”, Sisyphus, XII, 1999, p. 67.
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In Western Europę the supportive political statements of the early 
1990s have even given way to a ąuestioning of the whole process of en- 
largement. This frustration was growing up to the Nice-summit, at that 
time the years 2005 and 2006 were mentioned as the most likely dates of 
membership. The Nice summit, fortunately, solved some of the most dif- 
ficult institutional problems, i.e. the rules of voting in the council of mi- 
nisters. Furthermore, it was decided to speed up the negotiations, so the 
prospect of EU membership for the first CEEC in 2004 seems realistic, 
however, tough negotiations still have to be faced. Flexibility and will- 
ingness to compromise will be needed.
The main transformation steps
- Macroeconomic stabilization by means of restrictive monetary 
and fiscal policy
- Liberalization of prices
- Small-scale and large-scale privatisation and consequent re- 
structuring of the economy
- Liberalization of foreign trade
- Tax reform
- Establishment of standard market economy institutions, e.g. 
commercial and investment banks, stock exchanges etc.
As all the CEECs (still), in spite of all their problems, consider 
EU-membership their highest foreign policy goal, the EU is in a strong 
position to influence the internal politics of these countries. So far, it 
has done this vigorously and across the board, pressing the CEECs into 
implementing a global liberał vision of an open market policy, trans­
parent bureaucratic and political systems, and a democratic human 
right regime. As already said, there is no doubt that many of these 
measures have been implemented because of the desire to become 
a EU-member rather than out of genuine support for the goals them- 
selves. That can be seen not least in the case of Poland. Nevertheless, 
these measures have been implemented, also influencing the process of 
democratic consolidation in various ways; these measures have been 
partly positive, as the applicant countries have to adapt to the new re- 
alities and internalize the new goals, and partly negative, as some 
measures will lead to resistance within the local population and might 
even create a new Euro-sceptically inclined counter-elite [Koecki and 
Mudde, 2000, p. 532].
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“Losers” and “frontrunners”
The economic and political situation of the candidate countries varies, 
and it is therefore morę difficult to make generał conclusions. The East 
has ceased to constitute a “błock”, if it has done so at all. The economic 
conditions of the candidate countries were not the same from the outset 
and they have opted for different economic recovery and adjustment 
programmes. At the beginning the neo-liberal doctrines were almost uni- 
versal, e.g. former Czech prime minister Vaclav Klaus several times de- 
clared that a better environment was the result of morę market, not 
morę regulation, later the need for regulation and long term planning 
was morę accepted. Moreover, the CEECs have been affected to various 
degrees by the aftermath of the Asian and the Russian crises. Neverthe- 
less, over the last few years, the region has produced 2-3 per cent 
growth per year on average, with Poland and Hungary typically having 
the highest growth rates, infłation has decreased, but the trade and cur- 
rent account deficit has remained a big problem for almost all the ten 
applicant CEECs. For the first time sińce the transformation began, all 
transition economies recorded GDP growth in 2000. Some “latecomers”, 
e.g. Russia and Ukrainę, have shown the highest GDP-growth.
Stage III of the economic and monetary union
- The infłation ratę must be within 1.5 percentage points of the 
average ratę of the three States with the lowest infłation
- The long-term interest ratę must be within 2 percentage points of 
the average ratę of the three states with the lowest interest rates
- The national budget deficit must be below 3 pet. of GDP
- The national dept must not exceed 60 pet. of GDP
- The national currency must not have been devalued for two 
years and must have remained within the 2.5 pet. fluctuation 
margin provided for by the European Monetary System (EMS)
In other words, some of the traditional “losers” grew faster than the 
traditional “winners” of the transition process [Podkaminer et. al, 2001, 
p. i]. The differences in the rates of GDP change narrowed significantly 
across the region. The highest growth rates have been recorded in coun­
tries with a very Iow base and mostly under exceptionally favourable 
external conditions. Strong growth in the EU has also contributed to the 
growth acceleration in the most advanced countries. Expansion of exports
3 — Economic
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and imports has not, as already mentioned, generally reduce trade defi- 
cits. Rates of unemployment have generally increased. The process of de- 
flation has been perturbed by the developments in oil prices and hike of 
indirect taxation. However, seen from a strict macro-economic point of 
view it will not be impossible for most of the applicant countries to live up 
to Maastricht-criteria (Stage III of the economic and monetary union), as 
the main problems are linked to the structural transformation, e.g. deve- 
lopment of education, research, physical infrastructure and the recon- 
struction and competitiveness on enterprise-level.
Hungary has over the last years considered itself as no. 1 among the 
“frontrunner” states and has expressed fear that other morę “problem- 
atic” countries, e.g. Poland, would delay Hungary’s EU-membership. 
Seen from Budapest the assumed advantages of EU accession might be:2 
- Additional resources for the economy in the shape of working Capital, 
loans and aid
2Arguments put forward by Annamaria Artner in a paper/oral presentation given at 
the SFOF conference on the enlargement of the EU, Copenhagen, January 2001, "Hun­
gary and the enlargement of the European Union”.
3http:/www.centraleurope.com/news, March 1, 2001, EU Ambassador Details Short- 
comings in Hungary’s Accession Progress”, interview in the daily Nepszabadsag.
- Contribution to the financing and modernization of agriculture
- Morę foreign direct investments
- A growth in tourism and the foreign employment opportunities of the 
Hungarian labour force
- And security, i.e. morę “soft security” besides the “hard security” given 
thanks the membership of NATO
The Hungarian government hopes to finalize negotiations on the free 
movement of goods, services, people and Capital by June 2001 in its 
membership talks with the European Union. Hopes of closing the re- 
maining economic integration chapters with the EU have been raised by 
reports of a compromise on the issue of land ownership. Hungary has de- 
manded a 10-year limitation on land purchases after admission, while 
the EU has not even wanted to negotiate about that. Also the issue of 
free movement is until now unresolved.3 EU approval of the delay on 
foreign purchase of farms by EU-based operators, would make it easier 
to concede the EU’s main moratorium reąuest, postponing fuli access to 
its labour market for new members. Hungary aims to close a total of at 
least six chapters of the negotiation process in the first half of this year, 
including those pertaining to culture and corporate law. In the field of 
the environment, Hungary withdrew five of its original nine reąuests for 
temporary exemptions in an effort to reach a compromise morę quickly.
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It is still asking for temporary exemptions on the incineration of hazard- 
ous waste and communal water treatment.4 Nevertheless the EU am- 
bassador to Hungary, Michael Lakę, has criticized Hungary for not re- 
solving the issue of the independent supervision of public media and said 
that the possibility of the far-right Hungarian Justice and Life Party’s 
(MIEP) gaining a position in government after the next election also 
gives some reason for concern. It also appears as if Hungary and the 
EU cannot agree on the foreign ownership of land, either, but, as said, 
that ąuestion will be linked to the ąuestion about foreign purchases of 
rural land.
4 http://www.centraleurope.com/news, March 1, 2001, “Hungary Says EU membership
Talks Making Progress.”
6 “Manifest ceskeho eurorealismu" (dokument k ideove konferenci ODS), Duben 2001.
Internal political turmoil because of disagreements between CSSD 
and ODS over the interpretation of the so called “opposition agreements” 
could also delay The Czech Republic’s adaptation to “aquis commu- 
nautaire”. The liberał party ODS, that is expected to gain about 25 pet. 
of the votes at the 2002 election, has even adopted a “Manifest of Czech 
Euro-realism” and has demanded a tougher stand from the Czech go- 
vernment under the fortheoming, difficult negotiations with the EU.5 6
The social democrats are clearly morę “Euro-optimistic”, so EU-related 
questions will be a part of the election campaign that has already 
started. At the end of the French presidency of the European Union, the 
Czech Republic has 13 of the 31 chapters provisionally concluded, which 
is the same number as when the presidency began six months before. So 
the negotiations have to be speeded up.
The Czech government hoped that under the Swedish presidency up 
to 20 chapters might be concluded. The new “set-aside” method will al- 
low specific problems to be singled out, i.e. those chapters and topics 
that have to be further negotiated, possibly as part of a package at 
a later stage of the talks. That means that the chapters concerned can be 
provisionally closed. This principle should not be used to unnecessarily 
delay or postpone negotiations in those issues which can be solved imme- 
diately.
Romania belongs, together with Bułgaria, to the last group of appli- 
cant countries, i.e. those applicant countries which will not join the EU 
in the first enlargement to the East. However, some money at least can 
be obtained from the EU’s Stability Pact for the Balkans. Even the 
present Romanian Senate president Nicolae Vacaroiu reckons it would 
take the Romanian parliament 20 years to pass all the EU legislation
36 SÓREN RIISH0J
Romania needs, if it works at its normal speed.6 So EU-membership is 
morę a dream than a reality.
After Nice
The EU enlargement negotiations have started to address the most 
difficult subjects, which may have significant impact on the overall re- 
sult of the negotiations. According to the new enlargement strategy, de- 
cided during the European Councils meeting in Helsinki 10-11 Decem- 
ber 1999 and the time table and negotiation methodology confirmed at 
the Nice summit, each applicant will be judged on its own merits. This is 
applied both to the opening of the various negotiating chapters, i.e. spe- 
cific areas of EU law and policy such as the environment, taxation, agri- 
culture, free movement of goods etc., and to the conducting of the talks. 
Several times Germany, France and England have underlined that Po- 
land belongs to the “frontrunners”, i.e. among those countries that will 
join the EU in the first enlargement to the East. Recently president 
Kwaśniewski has talked about 2004 as Poland’s “accession year”. But 
tough negotiations are ahead, several times it has been stressed from 
Warsaw, that a country as big as Poland needs morę concessions than 
the “softer” smali countries, and that there exists a “red linę” that has to 
be passed, if the Polish people and the majority in parliament are to vote 
in favour of Polish EU-membership in the forthcoming referendum.
Poland’s road to EU-membership
- February 1992: Signing the association agreement with the EU
- February 1994: The association ratified and implementation 
gets under way
- June 1997: Poland appointed as one of the five so-called 
“frontrunner” States
- March 1998: The negotiations about futurę EU-membership 
starts
- November 2000: The EU-Commissions strategy-paper on fur- 
ther negotiations published
- Ultimo 2002: The negotiations between the EU and Poland are 
concluded
eBusiness Central Europę, February 2001, p. 37.
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Sweden, holding the chairmanship of the EU Council of Ministers for 
the first half of 2001, has always, like Denmark, been a strong advocate 
of the EU’s expansion but, sińce the December summit in Nice it feels it 
has the backing of the other 14 member States, too, at least in words. 
The Nice summit was a bit of a fudge, but it produced a treaty outlining 
how EU institutions and voting will work in an enlarged EU [O’Donell, 
2001, p. 44], With the Nice Treaty in hand, Sweden’s aim is to pave the 
way for a break-through in the membership negotiations, tackling some 
of the difficult topics, like the environment. But Sweden has run into dif- 
ficulties in this so-called “new phase” of enlargement. In any case, the 
real feelings of the key EU States about enlargement will be clearer after 
Nice. Several actors are involved, all with their own national interests. 
During the meetings of the EU foreign ministers, Spain especially has 
strongly underlined its resistance to pay for the enlargement via lower 
payments from the regional and structural funds. As far as the environ- 
ment is concerned, the Scandinavian EU-countries, especially Sweden 
and Denmark, belong to the “hawks”. Whether the European Commis- 
sion itself will support Sweden’s efforts to speed up the negotiations is 
also ąuestionable. Several semi-independent and badly co-ordinated ini- 
tiatives have come out of the Commission over the last months, covering 
almost everything, from environment to public health. That does not 
bodę well for Commission discipline, or for Sweden’s chances of success. 
After all, the negotiations will not be finished before the end of 2001, i.e. 
during the Danish EU chairmanship
At trilateral talks in the German town of Neustadt an der 
Weinstrasse in February 2001, chancellor Gerhard Schróder and Jaques 
Chirac confirmed that Poland would lead the next group of countries in 
joining the European Union. However, they stopped short of naming 
a elear accession datę to Polish president Aleksander Kwaśniewski. At 
the same time, Schróder reiterated his cali for a seven-year delay before 
the EU’s labour market is fully opened up to workers from new member 
States- a period Kwaśniewski said was too long.7 France seems omi- 
nously silent about enlargement sińce it completed as EU President in 
December, now, back at the EU table as just the other member states, it 
is expected that it is preparing to argue its own interests morę strongly. 
Under French chairmanship in the last half of year 2000, its achieve- 
ments, as usual, fell short of its rhetoric. At the Neustradt-meeting 
Jacąues Chirac dismissed concerns that the state of Poland’s inefficient
7 “Germany, France Back Poland’s EU Aspirations”, Central European Online 
28.2.2001.
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farm sector might force an overhaul of the EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy before current arrangements run out in 2006 (and before next 
French presidential election). There will be no changes before 2006, 
Chirac told a joint news conference, but it is needed to start thinking 
about how the changes will look after 2006.
The state of environment
The CEECs consume morę energy per capita than the European Uni­
on (EU) average, however, because of the lower per capita GDP, overall, 
the East European economies in the mid 1990s consumed 76 pet. as 
much energy per capita as do their counterparts in the EU, but produce 
only 31 pet. as much GDP per capita. The extensive growth practisedun- 
der state socialism led to the exploitation of coal. In the Czech Republic 
and Poland, for example, coal-fired power plants in the mid 1990s pro- 
vided morę than 75 pet. of the energy produced. Brown coal and lignite 
comprise the overwhelming proportion of mined coal in the region, al- 
though Poland has higher-ąuality hard coal.
The economic and health-related conseąuences of pollution have been 
considerable. Specialists in Poland calculate that pollution annually in- 
flicts economic costs-including damage to forests, soil contamination, 
and accelerated building corrosion-equivalent to between 10 and 20 per 
cent of the nation’s GDP. Officials estimate that the economic costs of ac­
celerated corrosion alone annually exceed the combined yearly state ex- 
penditure on education, medical services, and defence. Society also in- 
curs substantial economic costs through direct expenditure to limit 
pollution. A report from the European Commission estimates that the 
Czech Republic, in preparation for its planned entry into the EU, must 
invest morę than 7 billion dollars to bring its atmospheric emissions into 
compliance with EU standards.
The health-related costs of pollution have been similarly considerable, 
although naturally many other factors can combine to undermine an in- 
dividual’s physical wellbeing. In the most intensively polluted regions of 
Poland, where morę than two-thirds of all industrial air polluters are 
concentrated in areas containing half of Poland’s population but less 
than 15 pet. of its land mass, indicators for life expectancy, infant mor- 
tality, and birth defects are all substantially worse than the respective 
national averages. A similar situation occurs in the Northern Bohemia 
region of the Czech Republic, known as the “Triangle of Death”, where 
air pollution is so intense that the state-owned power company has insti- 
tuted a program called “Health in Northern Bohemia” designed to send
EU ENLARGEMENT, POLAND AND THE ENYIRONMENT 39
children suffering from various breathing-related problems to clean-air 
recovery centers.
However, over the years sińce 1989 there has been a sharp and 
readily apparent improvement in the environmental situation in most of 
the states of central and eastern Europę, most evident in the area of air 
pollution, where the emission of polluting substances has fallen sharply, 
easing the stress placed on the environment at the domestic, trans- 
border, and global levels. There has been a substantial improvement at 
both the aggregate level and in terms of the local environment, although 
one should be careful in drawing precise inferences from the air quality 
figures, which are subject to a rangę of local factors and therefore could 
look quite different regionally and locally.
However, the environmental policy has played only a limited role in 
determining the performance of CEECs. The single most important fac- 
tor has been the sharp decline in economic output throughout the region 
sińce 1989, which has been particular heavily concentrated in the most 
polluting heavy industries. Thus inevitably one must ask: “What hap- 
pens once the economies begin to grow again”? Poland’s economy has 
been growing steadily sińce 1992, while polluting emissions have contin- 
ued to decline, indicating that positive environmental policies can make 
a significant difference.
Indigenous reserves of both fuels have been limited, in several states 
(e.g. Bułgaria, Czechoslovakia) essentially non-existent. In the post-com- 
munist period, these countries have been seeking, with varying degrees 
of commitment and success, to diversify their sources of imported oil and 
natural gas. Their motives include fear of being overly dependent upon 
a politically unreliable and potentially threatening energy from the most 
competitive source on the international market. Most importantly, from 
the point of view of the environment, they are diversifying energy use as 
part of ambitious plans to utilize far morę “environmentally friendly” 
gaseous fuels imported from e.g. Norway.
The Czech Republic and Poland illustrate what EU membership will 
mean concretely for the environment. As noted, Prague has to spend 
morę than 7 billion dollars to bring its air pollution emissions into com- 
pliance with EU standards. The EU has estimated that the Czech Re­
public must spend an equal amount to meet the standards for water pu- 
rity and solid wastes. Substantially reducing its currently prodigious 
consumption of energy will be critical to the Czech Republic’s capacity to 
realize these goals. In Poland, the government, anticipating EU mem­
bership, in 1996 promulgated a program with an estimated cost of 
1.7 billion dollars to reduce emissions of sulphur dioxide by 45 per cent 
by 2010. Overall, the EU estimates that prospective members must
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spend approximately 132 billion dollars to meet EU environmental stan- 
dards. While recognizing that the Central and East European states will 
have difficulty financing these improvements and offering some EU as- 
sistance to this end, in May 1998 the EU’s environment commissioner 
publicly warned that prospective members must rely primarily upon 
their own resources and would receive no permanent exceptions.
The ongoing accession negotiations between the EU and the applicant 
countries have shown that the candidates’ administrative capacity is one 
of the most difficult bottlenecks on the way to the enlargement of the 
EU. That conclusion also govern the environmental field. In the view of 
the European Commission, administrative capacity is the availability of 
sufficient legał, organisational, budgetary and human resources assu- 
ring the implementation of the aquis communautaire. The importance of 
administrative capacity results from the European Council’s decision 
that each applicant country has to adopt and apply the entire aquis 
communautaire by the time of its accession. Implementing the aquis 
turned out to be a much morę demanding task sińce it requires to build 
up appropriate institutions, to develop qualified administrative person- 
nel and to induce economic actors to comply with the new legał regula- 
tions. In other words, the institutional approach has to be supplemented 
by a morę functional approach emphasising the “governance” aspect of 
policy-making. Modernisation theory would suggest that executive per­
formance depends on the degree of professionalism of public administra- 
tion, and the degree of functional differentiation between administrative 
and political roles and tasks. Within this paradigm, the politicization of 
the civil service is seen as a legacy of State socialism that has to be over- 
come by reforming and modernising public administration, sińce in the 
Weberian view a partisan bureaucracy represents a symptom of back- 
wardness [See Brusis, 2000, pp. 40, 51].
The negotiations with the EU on environment
There are principally two motives behind requiring compromise both 
in the case of the applicant countries and the EU. First, the fear of com- 
petition, i.e. a sudden increase of competitive pressure on markets of 
various goods, e.g. industrial and agricultural commodities, items for 
public procurement, real estate etc, or labour (migrants). The second mo- 
tive is “no funding auailable” wtńch refers to the lack of funds to under- 
take an obligation which would be in principle compulsory under the 
prevailing EU rules, i.e. “aquis communitaire” [Richter, 1998, p. 35], The 
last motive is strong in case of Polish requirement of compromise on en- 
vironment. From the EU side “transfer compromises” are required, not
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because the funds are not available or could be so, but because of “unre- 
alized revenues”, e.g. those funds could only be available by raising the 
incumbant EU-members payments to the EU budget or limiting the 
transfer of money to the south European Countries and Ireland. Morę 
transfers of money to the CEECs could foster an “Irish miracle” or, alter- 
nately, a “Greek failure”, in the last case the money could be wasted due 
to lack of fiscal discipline and purely redistribution orientation. Seen 
from Brussels the acceptance of reąuirements of compromise, e.g. on the 
environment, could mean losses due to morę competition under uneąual 
conditions, e.g. in the case of EU firms moving to Eastern Europę be­
cause of lower environmental standards (“ecological dumping”). That ar­
gument has often been put forward from the Danish side, e.g. from the 
Danish minister for environment, Sven Auken.
The approach to dealing with environmental issues has changed 
sińce the fali of state socialism. In 1998 work on amending the II Na­
tional Environmental Policy (II NEP) was started in Poland, this being 
the political and strategie document, that will set the directions of state 
action in the field of environmental protection for the coming decades.8 
The former document, National Environmental Policy, adopted by 
a Resolution of Parliament on May 10, which constitutes the basis for 
elaboration of the new document, will be subject to deep revision and 
reformulation of its assumptions and objectives, so that it takes into ac- 
count the new challenges and tasks connected with Poland’s accession 
to the European Union. The old document, National Environmental 
Policy, had been based on the sustainable development principle al- 
ready one year prior to the “Environment and Development” Confe- 
rence of the United Nations, which took place in Rio de Janeiro (June 
1992) and prior to the adoption of Agenda 21. That document contained 
objectives, priorities and tasks as well as institutional Solutions, legał 
and economic instruments necessary for their implementation in three 
time horizons: short-term (until 1995), medium-term (until 2010) and 
long-term (until 2020).
8 Document approved by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland on April 26, 
2000.
The II National Enoironmental Policy will include all these issues, 
which had not been clearly identified when the first, original version had 
been drawn up, e.g.:
- Achieving the objectives and standards specified in the environmental 
acquis communautaire.
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- Achieving the objectives defined in the Framework Convention of the 
United Nations concerning climate changes and the Kyoto Protocol.
- Harmonisation of the way of implementation of the Convention on 
biodiversity protection of the European Union.
- Achieving the objectives defined in the Geneva Convention and in the 
II Sulphur Protocol.
According to a resolution of Parliament of 19 January 1995, the II Na­
tional Environmental Policy has to extend its scope of relations from the 
environmental sector to other sectors (industry, energy sector, transport, 
agriculture, tourism, fisheries, building, trade and municipal economy) 
and also sectors such as health and social welfare, labour market and 
education. This will allow fuli integration of environmental, economic 
and social aspects.
Despite progress in the transposition of EU rules into national laws in 
most areas, the fact that law enforcement bodies are often understaffed 
and operate without adeąuate financial means hampers the effective ap- 
plication of new laws also in the environmental field. On December 1999 
the candidate countries formally opened talks in the field of environ- 
ment, those negotiations are expected to be long and difficult. Poland is 
the country which has put forward the highest number of requests for 
long transitional periods in this field. Nevertheless, in compliance with 
its official policy to join the EU on January 1 2003, Poland has under- 
taken to complete a transposition to the European environmental legis- 
lation by December 31, 2002. At the same time the request for 14 transi­
tional periods for the implementation of specific pieces of EU legislation 
was presented. Depending on the legislation the transitional periods 
vary from three to thirteen years. The longest transitional period of 
13 years for implementation of specific pieces of EU legislation was re- 
quested. Overall Poland has presented requests for 30 transitional peri­
ods in the implementation of EU legislation. However, Poland is ready to 
fully implement 20 out of the 29 chapters that are subject to negotia­
tions on the day of accession. At the beginning of 2001 Poland seems to 
be resigning from requests for compromises in some issues on environ- 
ment, e.g. in questions about quality of petrol and the liberalisation of 
gas and electricity markets before the year 2005. Requests are still madę 
in the most complex and costly fields, including the EU-demand for 
90 days stocks of liquid fuel.
The Polish requests for compromises are mainly motivated by high in- 
vestment costs, e.g. in terms of environmental infrastructure complying 
with EU law. According to the Ministry of the Environment, Poland pre- 
sently invests approximately 1.8 per cent of its GDP in the environment, 
which is high compared with other European countries, 95 per cent of the
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costs are financed by Poland, e.g. by firms and State and semi-private and 
private funds.9 The fact that the cost of implementing the environmental 
reąuirements for Polish EU accession is estimated at 30 billion EURO 
over the next 15 years seems to significantly determine the Polish ap- 
proach towards the negotiations. However, seen from Brussels, in parti- 
cular the reąuests for transitional periods the in adoption and imple- 
mentation of legislation, which has important conseąuences for the 
internal market, will have to be vigorously opposed by the European au- 
thorities. It is argued by the Polish side that the transposition of 
EU-rules on the environment is impossible to carry through, not only be- 
cause of lack of funds. Such big investments over such a short time are 
simply impossible to carry out also for obvious technical reasons.
9 Rzeczpospolita 15.2. 2001, p. B3.
The short-term objectives contained in the Polish Accession partner- 
ship programme provide for drafting, in the year 2000, a legał approxi- 
mation strategy for the environmental sector, including directive-specific 
approximation and implementation programmes, acceleration of trans­
position with special focus on the air pollution and waste framework di- 
rectives, industrial pollution control and industry related directives and 
water directives. The management of industrial and municipal waste is 
a serious problem in Poland. About 89 per cent of all waste is madę up of 
industrial waste, mainly mining, post-flotation waste, fly-ash and slag 
from power stations and the Steel industry as well as phosphogypsums. 
About 11 per cent of waste comes from municipal sources. Both groups 
contain hazardous waste. In the past 15 years the volume of waste pro- 
duced, including hazardous waste, decreased by approximately 30 per 
cent. However, the volume of waste collected over the past years in 
dumping sites has been growing. The authorities will develop a financial 
investment plan for the implementation of investment in the field of air, 
water and waste, as well as industrial pollution control. Completion of 
transposition and enforcement of the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Directive is also foreseen in the national accession partnership program.
Nevertheless, Poland is considered by the EU-Commission, including 
the Swedish commissioner for environment Margot Wallstróm, as the 
applicant country most reluctant to adopt the aquis in the environment 
field. Parliament indeed adopted the law on the evaluation of the impact 
of new investments on the environment, but only after the EU threa- 
tened to withdraw some of its financial support intended for Poland. 
However, Poland has not been able to inform the Commission who, when 
and how the EU rules on environment will be transposed into Polish
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law. “The 15” will have to take a decision on complying with Polish re- 
ąuests for compromises without such information. However, the presen- 
tation of these plans will be extremely difficult, for local authorities, en- 
terprises, power stations etc. are not capable of giving the information 
demanded. According to the Polish authorities detailed plans cannot be 
published before 2005, the most difficult task is to obtain the necessary 
information from private enterprises. After all, almost every calculation 
of costs for environmental projects for the period beyond 2008-10 inevi- 
tably belongs to “futurology”, as nobody know long-term costs, as men- 
tioned, maybe 30-40 billion EURO for Poland, all taken together. The 
legał, organisational and budgetary resources ensuring the implemen- 
tation of aąuis communautaire are not available. The ministry of Envi- 
ronment is heavily understaffed, consisting of just 250-300 (underpaid) 
people.
According to Margot Wallstróm, the Commission can only accept com­
promises on the most cost-heavy fields. According to her evaluation, 
among the applicant countries Poland has presented most reąuests in 
environment field, for the simple reason that very “tough negotiations” 
are ahead. In Denmark and Sweden, the two EU-countries that can be 
considered as the “hawks” in the negotiations on the environment, we 
must not, as rightly mentioned by Krzystyna Forowicz,10 forget that Po­
land can offer Europę much as far as environment is concerned. Poland 
has a rich and fascinating geography, much morę ecological agriculture 
than, for instance, Denmark and according to her even morę healthy fo- 
rests than we find in e.g. Germany, Denmark, Belgium and the Czech 
Republic.
10 27.11.2000, p. A9.
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